This working paper examines key barriers to business sustainability discussed at a multidisciplinary conference held at the Harvard Business School in 2018. Drawing on perspectives from both the historical and business literatures, speakers debated the historical success and future opportunities for voluntary business actions to advance sustainability.
were sometimes aligned, but they disagreed that these incentives alone were sufficient to allow a new road to environmental protection. Ongoing improvement, they noted, implied a history of systematic managerial failure. 23 If past managers had chosen their actions wisely, no opportunities for voluntary action would exist. Thus, economists argued that any proposal for voluntary action must provide proof that managers had systematically erred in the past.
In search of a logic for historical managerial misjudgment, researchers focused on a possible scarcity of information for decision-making. 24 To make effective decisions, managers must evaluate both the costs and benefits of their options. If they lacked such information, they might make sub-optimal choices, and thereby miss opportunities to protect the environment profitably. Scholars argued that such missing information was endemic to environmental issues, and justified their claim by pointing to the dispersed nature of environmental benefits; restrictive organizational structures; and the need for new skills to interpret unfamiliar information about environmental performance.
Evidence of win-win innovations (changes that benefited both the firm and the environment) supported claims that voluntary action could be effective. Andrew King documented "innovation offsets" following water-pollution regulation. 25 Stephen J. Decanio and Lee argued that innovation could reduce the use of ozone depleting chemicals. 26 Höglund-
Isaksson concluded that reductions in nitrous-oxide emissions were accomplished at little or no cost. 27 Michael Porter, a strategy professor at the Harvard Business School, suggested that environmental regulation, if it was strict and well designed, could enhance business competitive advantage. 28 In doing so, he proposed a way that the old regulatory road and new voluntary one could be merged. 29 The idea of a "new road" is not entirely new. In the Progressive Era of the United States, an idea similar to the modern "new road" became widely popular. It too shared an emphasis on 'eco-efficiency' although the concept was not yet coined. It proposed that as industrial operations grew more efficient the environment would be protected. For example, in the 1920s, efficient coal use was used as the key selling point for smoke abatement. 30 One American engineering periodical proclaimed in 1926 that "Every dollar that goes up in the chimney in smoke is a wasted dollar". 31 The 1920s was overall characterized by ideas of business selfregulation, where business was expected to police themselves, and deal with all sorts of social issues.
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In the 1930s, US President Theodore Roosevelt, himself a strong conservationist, put the issue of efficiency high on the national agenda. 33 Plant owners looked for efficiency measures that could improve the bottom line. In the mind of the engineers and technical managers in the US petroleum industry, pollution became a short-term problem that would be eliminated by the application of engineering efficiency. As Hugh Gorman has noted in this journal, petroleum managers and engineers came to believe that economic incentives to improve efficiency also served long-term efforts to fight pollution. 34 In parts of Europe, pollution control became associated with improving the bottom line. For example, managers in the Swedish copper industry shared a view that pollution represented lost profits and poor stakeholder relations, and thus they engaged in voluntary pollution control measures. 35 Timothy LeCain reported that attempts to implement win-win strategies in the US copper industry through efficiency measures created new environmental problems. The cost savings made possible by improved efficiency allowed companies to mine farther than before, which caused further disastrous environmental impact. The key abatement technology invented in the 1910s, the electric precipitator, cut plant emissions considerably, but the use of the technology in an eco-efficient way both retarded the implementation of effective air pollution controls and created an entirely new set of environmental problems. 36 Potential problems with the efficiency agenda also have antecedents in this earlier period. Gorman argues that attempts to reduce pollution through increased efficiency resulted in diminishing returns. In the US petroleum industry, it no longer made economic sense to reduce pollution-causing discharges. Jones has argued that the focus on efficiency also impeded development of substitutes.
He noted that early entrepreneurs developed and invented basic technologies in wind and solar power and organic food, but these ventures proved to be painfully difficult to make profitable in competition with cheap fossil fuels. Eventually, it took more than one hundred years for the wind industry to develop and scale, and even then, governmental support was needed to make it happen.
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Roadblocks to the New Voluntary Road to Environmental Protection 39
What barriers prevent firms from realizing ways to profit while protecting the environment?
Participants in our conference "Understanding and Overcoming Roadblocks to Sustainability", considered this question. They documented some of the main impediments to action, evaluated the importance of supporting institutions, considered the inertia of social-technical systems, and debated the inherent capacity of voluntary approaches. Some even questioned whether the 'new' voluntary road to environmental protection was headed toward the right objective.
Organizational barriers
Auden Schendler, a long-time environmental activist and author, argued that organizational barriers and budget constraints make even simple changes difficult to accomplish. His book "Getting Green Done" documented some of the challenges he faced in implementing simple improvements, such as installing efficient lighting in the company's garage and lodge. 40 He argued that win-win opportunities exist, but that barriers often block their implementation. what is important to monitor and measure that these institutions are able to move on specific policy goals. One of the questions Gorman raised was whether indices ranking the "sustainability" corporations are helpful, and whether the institutions that create and track such metrics are transparent enough to allow external actors to access their meaning and accuracy.
George Serafeim argued that metrics and measurements form the basis for internal organizational decision making and investor decisions, and are therefore decisive in incentivizing change. 45 He noted that over the past several years, the number of firms that measure and report on their environmental social and governance (ESG) activities and performance has grown considerably, but he noted that these metrics tend to be idiosyncratic and unsuited to comparison across firms. One important roadblock to action, he noted, is caused by a lack of leadership in standardizing new metrics and disclosure standards. As a result, it is difficult to compare the performance of firms in a meaningful way. 46 He raised concern about the potential for new type of agency problem. Activist agents could manipulate corporate action without regard to the interest of stakeholders.
Megan Epler Wood a practitioner in the formation of the field of ecotourism, noted that private action is now spreading beyond "point source" polluters to other types of business activity.
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For example, in the hope that new measures will allow greater awareness of environmental impacts, firms involved in eco-tourism are developing new ways to measure and report the effect of their operations. A problem Wood noted that business active in tourism have created a wide range of environmental impacts, but existing metrics and certification do not measure or report these costs in an understandable way. A key problem is that states and countries have created and adopted certifications that are not comparable, and as a result, consumers have stepped back from certification systems, because they are impossible to interpret, let alone to compare.
Inertia of Human Systems
Participants in the conference pointed out that consequential protection of the natural environment requires fundamental change in energy systems, but doing so requires overcoming the inertia inherent in any complex social-technical system.
Abby Spinak noted that existing systems for local governance were developed to support the electrification of rural North America. 48 Cooperatives allowed local communities to pool assets for the social good and regulate distribution. Unfortunately, these organizations now pose a barrier to system change, because existing cooperatives prioritize local benefits over systemwide value. She concluded that needed infrastructure improvements, such as new transmission lines for distributed power from wind and solar, can be impeded by the very social system intended to support electrification.
Marten Boon documented the inertia of technical and social systems in the oil industry, and he described how firms deflected public pressure by subsuming it into a vaguer objective.
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He illustrated how firms in the oil industry faced significant pressure to change their investments toward lower-carbon energy. Faced with growing social pressure, they began to adapt, but then were "rescued" from needing to change by the emergence of a new popular objective" "sustainability". Because the term "sustainability" is both broad and ill defined, oil companies could substitute action in other areas for protection of the environment. They could, for example, argue they were advancing sustainability by providing other social benefits -such as employment. Armed with new metrics and glossy brochures, oil companies could, and did, advocated for public policy that sustained the carbon path.
Martha Crawford argued that the complicated interconnections of energy infrastructures imply that governmental policy is the only effective tool. She reported that the European regulation, particularly the European Union Emissions Trading System, has resulted in significant reductions in CO2 emissions, but that these improvements have not been without pain.
The cost of new generation and transmissions has been passed on to customers and some major utilities have seen their market value fall by more than 60 percent.
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The capacity of the new road
Many of the participants in the conference expressed skepticism in the capacity of the new, voluntary, road to environmental protection, and doubted that it could allow meaningful change.
Rome, Schendler, Bergquist, and King all emphasized the importance of continuing misalignments between private business incentives and environmental protection. Bergquist argued that the continuing, and structural problem of externalities begs the question of the role of governments, and she argued that governmental policy has proven to be very important in inducing substantive change, and often explains why firms based in some countries and regions have made more progress than others. She was critical about how the concept of sustainability has been translated into business practice and argued that it has delayed necessary reorientations, largely because of how the concept has been defined and used in different contexts.
Adam Rome argued that effect measurement and regulation of environmental damage was a necessary condition for meaningful action, but it was insufficient unless coupled with regulatory controls. He noted that DuPont's attempts at voluntary action were strongly supported throughout the company, yet the company nevertheless encountered difficulties "again and again, and in all sorts of ways". Chief among these problems was the relentless pressure from competitors who produced dirtier but less expensive products. Indeed, Rome expressed skepticism that such competition ever could be overcome in the absence of regulation. In his words, the failure to account for true costs is "basic, basic, basic", and even if it might be tempting to talk about other important issues, we need to remind ourselves; "it's the externalities stupid". as it basically discourages companies to peruse long-term strategies. She said that progress is being made in this area, where asset owners, asset managers and corporations are working together to come up with practical ways to elongate the time frames in capital markets. FCLT now has a consortium of about the forty of the largest players worldwide, and one way to work in this area is to create contracts between assets holders, assets managers and corporations that are more long term.
Cheryl Smith of Trillium Investments -a firm that has been practicing sustainable and responsible investing since its founding in 1982 -stressed that assets owners and assets managers need to understand the ways in which corporations are externalizing their costs. Smith noted that that there has been, and still is, a strong incentive for corporations to externalize them, and the question is simply how to deal with that. The way Trillium and its founder Johan Bavaria have worked, is to take the perspective of the owner, and think of how to get the owner's perspective aligned with the managers perspective and how to get the managers perspective aligned with the society as whole, and win the externalities. "What actually works is engaging
with corporations, what actually works is persistence".
Shawn Cole argued that "impact investing" could potentially increase private incentives to protect the environment. 52 Cole noted that there seems to be great opportunity for significantly more capital to move in this area, and the key driver of movement seems to be demographic trends. At the same time, he noted, there remains a large knowledge gap. The core academic finance community has until very recently showed limited interest in the issue and as a result, there is a lack of hard evidence concerning the conditions for effective progress. Nevertheless, he argued, impact investing should be approached as a possible route to meaningful improvements.
The wrong destination?
Scholars at the conference also debated whether the new road might be headed in the wrong direction. John Ehrenfeld, argued that the current objectives are polluted by misguided economic analysis. 53 He challenged the logic of welfare equilibria based on self-interest and argued that it is antithetical to sustainability. Ehrenfeld referred to sustainability as a co-complex system whose analysis is beyond our present ability because we lack the methods, the patience, and the systemic vision needed to understand it. We only know that it is headed in the wrong direction, implying that sustaining it is the wrong course of action. Otto Scharmer agreed with Ehrenfeld that new modes of human cognition and interaction are needed and argued for a radical transformation of capitalism. 55 Scharmer conceptualized this transformation as a journey from the existing ego-system awareness, which focus on the wellbeing of yourself, to an eco-system, which focuses on the well-being of a whole. Scharmer proposed a model for how the transformation might occur. He began by diagnosing what he said was the root cause of the problem: that we lack the quality of thinking, including our quality of economic thought, to design our social institutions. He proposed a set of stages through which humankind needed to progress if progress was to be made. In simple terms, the transformation would require a U-shaped journey that would start with understanding based on an opening of minds, then hearts, and finally will. 56 It would then proceed back through this process as changes were implemented. The transformation would require supporting infrastructures, including new governance systems and metrics. 57 Not surprisingly, in a multidisciplinary conference with historians, business academics and professionals, identification of a passable future road differed. Yet, many of the participants agreed the original objective of the new road based on voluntary action had become diffuse, making progress very difficult.
Summary and concluding remarks
Economic development has enabled improvement in the human condition in every part of the world: people are healthier, more educated, better housed, and better fed than ever before. These remarkable socioeconomic improvements have been accomplished at a cost; a deteriorating global environment with climate change threatening the human civilization as we know it. 58 The environmental historian Donald Worster have noted that the environmentalism that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s had a clear destination and obvious route. The goal in the 1970s was to save the living world around us, including humans from destruction by our "technology, population
and appetites". But the painful difficulties to make the needed turn in the 1970s, and head in a diametrically opposite direction, made people look at a less strenuous road. By the mid-1980s, the new road called sustainable development emerged. 59 With a strong belief in voluntary action, sustainability quickly became business mainstream in 1990s and hopes were raised that the business community would take a leadership in reshaping capitalism to protect the environment.
Thousands of corporate sustainability reports have been produced since then, and a voluminous literature about sustainability in management journals, if not their business history counterparts.
Despite several decades of efforts from the business community and the academic community environmental fundamentals have continued to deteriorate sharply.
The conference debated critical questions about existing roadblocks, or whether the road is even passable. It was concluded that three decades of writers asserting that win-win solutions are possible, have made it all seem too easy to achieve results. Sustainability has become reconciled with success in generating profits, rather than focusing on preventing further deterioration of the natural environment. The imprecision of sustainability discourse has led businesses to understand the very definition and metrics of "sustainable business" as a competitive space.
It was reported at the conference that trend among firms to adopt new metrics has been strong and is not likely to slow down. The trend is the same in the capital markets; a growing interest among investors engage in socially responsible-and impact investing. Yet, a major roadblock today is the absence of a common set of sustainability metrics, which makes it very difficult for investors to compare and discriminate between corporations, and understand what is being measured. Great uncertainty remains around what impact of new metrics will have in changing business behavior and ultimately environmental outcomes in the long run. More worrisome is the risk that even perfect new metrics, widely adopted, would incorrectly focus management attention on operational greening-reducing pollution, and carbon footprint, at the firm level, instead of on the threat that global climate change presents to entire economies. In a world headed towards warming beyond 2 degrees Celcius, whether Patagonia or Dupont cuts emission 20 percent, 30 percent, or even to zero, has little, or no bearing on sustainability at large. 60 Historians at the conference stressed that creating robust governance systems takes time,
and that cultural values and technological systems and the very market rules makes it difficult, even impossible, for established firms to change the course through voluntary action, even when they have had the best intentions. New historical research has also documented how green entrepreneurs throughout history have encountered barriers in developing and scaling their businesses, basically because of the same reason; that competition with firms who do not count for their externalities, makes it very difficult for greener alternatives to compete. 61 Both historians and management scholars were inclined to emphasize the importance of the "old road"; to acknowledge and revisit the role of governments and governmental interventions to shift the market rules, but also in creating robust environmental governance systems. Energy transition, for example, is not only about green-niche innovation, but socio-technical transitions, in which business and capital markets is only a part of the puzzle.
Scholars at the conference were critically concerned about the impact of the very concept of sustainability since it has made protecting the environment a tool for greenwashing and marketing with little practical change. But as John Ehrenfeld argued, sustainability does not exist at the firm level, it is a property of a whole system in which business is interconnected with other nodes: other firms, regulators, banks, consumers, and not the least the natural environment itself.
Therefore, achieving sustainability concerns the health of the whole system, and studying pieces of the system in detail will not be helpful in understanding how the system can be changed. In summary, proponents of the old road to environmental protection assume that human welfare can be maximized if the environment is used efficiently, and they conclude that failure to maximize welfare is caused by "externalities" or other distortions in the conditions necessary for well-functioning exchange. They contend that environmental problems, and their correction, are the responsibility of government; firms are expected to act within these constraints and will not manage to solve grand challenges like climate change voluntarily, as long as the price signals are structurally wrong.
Appendix 2 Business attempts to widen the new road
From the 1970s to the present, corporations in the United States created institutions to support voluntary protection of the environment. 68 For example, corporations operating in the nuclear Economists and political scientists have long recognized the potential for firms to engage in self-regulation, but usually they have assumed it would be at the expense of the common good. Adam Smith famously opined that "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices." 69 Yet business attempts to coordinate for the public good have a long history. Pre-industrial practices governing the sharing of resources represent a form of coordination for the public interest. 70 In early modern German forestry, the notion of Nachhaltigkeit, (lastingness in English) was introduced as a concept aiming at achieving continuous, steady, and sustained growth of timber for future generations. 71 Ellinor Ostrom documented many examples where actors set up rules for governing communal resources. 72 Other scholars have shown that such collusion for the good also occurs among modern business.
Ingram and Inman, for example, report that Hotels around Niagara Falls formed agreements to protect the shared resource. 73 Furger reports the importance of collective governance in Maritime Shipping. 74 Other attempts to align private and public interests have addressed the information problems common to environmental goods and services. Recognizing that customers cannot evaluate the environmental attributes of products, companies have set up systems for maintaining a credible chain of custody. Unilever was influential in creating the Marine Stewardship council, which provides certification of the sustainable operation of fisheries around the world 75 . In capital finance, several private companies have created systems for evaluating and rating the social and environmental performance of publicly traded companies. Such information allows investors to consider information about environmental impact when making investments or choosing trade partners. These rating systems also provide firms with a benchmark for evaluating their own performance.
Firms have also banded together to coordinate collective investment. For example, in project finance, each bank in a syndicate providing loans to a project shares part of the risk of failure but the entire cost of evaluating that risk. This can give rise to a free-riding problem where each bank expects the other to do the assessment for the group. In the hope of reducing such free riding, leading banks created a set of requirements for project due-diligence -the Equator Principles. These principles require assessment and public documentation of the environmental and social impacts of all major projects. 
